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CHAPTER 1 
Public Utilities 
PETER ROTH 
§1.1. Introduction. The 1971 SuRvEY year was marked by an emer-
ging concern for the consuming public by the Department of Public 
Utilities. (D.P.U.). In the two Supreme Judicial Court cases of interest, 
there was basic disagreement between the Court and the department 
over such issues as attrition, 1 cost of service during a test year,2 and 
the selection of a capital structure appropriate for rate-setting pur-
poses. Whereas departmental policy in these areas tended to give the 
benefit of the doubt to the consumer, the Court has seemingly enun-
ciated its own regulatory philosophy by giving the benefit of the doubt 
to the utility company. In the area of administrative law, departmental 
concern for the consumer was expressed in the maximum rate order 
on towing by police, the denial by the D.P.U. of an increase in mini-
mum rates for the carriage of dump truck commodities, and regulations 
on billing and termination procedures for residential customers of 
gas and electric companies. Similar concern was evidenced by depart-
mental support of House Bill 5336, relative to assessing certain utility 
corporations for payment of part of the cost of operating the D.P.U. 
A. CouRT DECISIONS 
§1.2. Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities.I Feb-
ruary 12, 1969, the Boston Gas Company filed with the D.P.U. re-
quests for rate increases totaling $3,493,600.2 After public hearings 
and consideration, the department disallowed the new filings by orders 
dated January 8 and March 4, 1970, and ruled that the company was 
entitled to increases limited to $2,021,022. The company put these 
PETER ROTH is counsel for the Department of Public Utilities and a partner in the firm 
of Bulkley, Richardson, Ryan and Gelinas, Springfield. 
§I. I. 1 "The term 'attrition' refers to 'the tendency ofthe rate of return to diminish in a 
period of comparatively high construction costs' when new and 'relatively expensive' 
plant is being added." Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
609, 621 n.l9, 269 N.E.2d 248, 257 n.l9. 
2 The term test year refers to "a recent operating period during which revenues, ex· 
penses, and plant requirements are either generally in balance, in the sense that the[ir] 
relationship ... is generally representative of the recent past, and therefore likely to be 
representative of the near term future, or can be so adjusted that such relationships are 
representative of the nearterm future." Id. at 626 n.23, 269 N .E.2d at 260 n.23. 
§1.2. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609, 269 N.E.2d 248. 
2D.P.U.l6102. 
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increases into effect and appealed from that part of the decision which 
had denied the remainder. 
While this appeal was pending, the company applied to the Su-
preme Judicial Court for a stay of the department's orders, which 
would allow the company to collect the disputed amount subject to 
repayment to the consumer. This application was considered and 
denied by a single Justice on April 7, 1970, but without prejudice to 
its renewal at a later time. Thereafter the company did reapply, and 
a stay was granted on December 11, 1970. Accordingly, the company 
began to collect from its customers the disputed amount of approxi-
mately $1.5 million and continued to do so until the Court rendered 
its decision on the appeal on April 15, 1971. On that date, the Su-
preme Judicial Court remanded the case to the department for further 
proceedings, concluding that the department "has closely restricted 
the rates allowed to [the] Company, and in doing so has resorted to 
tests and estimates which (in respects noted) have tended to under-
state [the] Company's reasonable revenue requirements."3 The de-
partment was directed by the Court to reconsider several issues and to 
file additional findings and rulings on these questions in accordance 
with the views expressed by the Justices. While the proceedings upon 
remand have not been completed, it is clear that compliance with the 
Court's decision will require the department to approve the $1.5 mil-
lion increase. 
On an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of a rate decision of 
the D.P.U., the burden is upon the petitioning company to establish 
that revenues presently received for its services are inadequate to pro-
vide a fair return upon investment in property used in extending 
utility service.4 Consequently, it is necessary to make determinations 
regarding the amount of investment in such property (rate base), the 
cost of service during a test year (in this proceeding, 1968), and the 
fair rate of return to be allowed. In the process of making these deter-
minations, there were disagreements between the company and the 
department. 
Cost of capital. The D.P.U. rejected use of the gas company's actual 
capital structure (53.7 percent debt, 46.3 percent equity at the time of 
the hearings) and calculated capital costs upon the basis of a pro-
jected 60 percent debt, 40 percent equity ratio which the department 
believed to be desirable, as well as attainable in the near future. On 
January 8, 1970, when the D.P.U. announced its rate decision, it ex-
pected that the company would be able to borrow at 8 percent. Later 
financing, however, did not work out as well as had been anticipated, 
and the effective interest cost of the new bonds to the company was 
9. 73 percent. The new bonds increased the company's debt ratio to 
only 56 percent because the company limited the new issue and aban-
doned any plan to reduce its capital stock. The company thereupon 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609, 632,269N.E.2d248, 263. 
4 G.L., c. 25, §5. 
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obtained an order directing the D.P.U. to transmit to the Supreme 
Judicial Court the evidence concerning the unexpectedly high cost 
and more limited amount of the new 1970 debt issue.5 The company 
contended that it should be treated as having the 56 percent - 44 per-
cent debt-equity capital structure in effect after the 1970 bond issue. 
In opposition, the D.P.U. contended that the Supreme Judicial Court 
should not consider the changed circumstances which arose after the 
department's rate decision of January 8, 1970, and, indeed, even after 
the modification of that decision on March 4, 1970. 
The Supreme Judicial Court said that it would not remand this 
case for a new hearing since the limited additional evidence to be ad-
duced at said hearings relates to matters of public record contained in 
the D.P.U.'s own files. The Court stated: 
It is now possible and proper for us (since the "rate order is chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds in this court") and for the 
D.P.U., to examine and evaluate the current facts with the aid of 
"the improved vision of intervening experience." See Boston Con-
sol. Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 327 Mass. 103, 104-107, 
97 N.E.2d 521; Opinion of the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 686-690, 106 
N.E.2d 259, 263 (where the Justices said that this murt, with re-
spect to constitutional issues, in performing its duty to afford "a 
utility claiming confiscation . . . an independent judicial re-
view as to both law and fac·t," must have. authority to require the 
production of "new evidence necessary to bring the proof as near-
ly as reasonably possible down to the date of final decision").6 
The Court also said: 
If, during the pendency of this appeal, Company had been 
able to issue debt obligations at a substantially lower interest cost 
than had been predicted, parties other than Company could have 
brought that evidence to the attention of this court.7 
As previously noted, however, the legislature had established a proce-
dure in rate cases whereby the utility requesting a rate increase from the 
D.P.U. has the burden of establishing that revenues presently received 
for its services are inadequate to provide a fair return upon investment 
in property used and useful in extending utility service. It would ap-
pear that by its remand to the department, the Court has disregraded 
the legislative determination that the burden of proof shall rest on the 
utility company.8 The Court has accepted .the testimony of the com-
pany without allowing the D.P. U. to analyze or contest that testimony. 
5 This additional evidence included the gas company's 1969 return to the D.P.U., filed 
about March 31, 1970, two orders of the D.P.U. authorizing specified financing by the 
company, and excerpts from certain testimony before the D.P.U. concerning that financ-
ing. See D.P.U. 16470 and 16470-A. 
6 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609,614, 269N.E.2d248,.252. 
7 Id.at615 n.l0,269N.E.2dat253 n.IO. 
s G.L., c. 25, §5. 
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The rationalization by the Court that the department could have pre-
sented evidence appears to place a burden upon the department which 
was not envisaged by the legislature. The Court in Boston Gas, in re-
manding to the D.P. U. forfurther hearings and a new decision, has not 
only made a determination that the rate of return is confiscatory, but, 
by hearing new evidence and establishing a new capital structure and 
rate of return, has also preempted the departmental prerogative of es-
tablishing its regulatory philosophy. 
Relying in part on evidence arising after the hearings and on evi-
dence arising subsequent to issuance of the department's original 
order, the Supreme Judicial Court went on to hold that the depart-
ment could not, on the record before it, substitute a projected capital 
structure for the structure actually in effect during the test year. The 
Court said: 
It would be unreasonable, and an undue interference with reason-
able Company judgment, for the D.P.U. to insist that Company's 
rate ofreturn conform with precision to what the D.P. U. regards as 
an optimum 60% debt ratio. Within a substantial range this is a 
matter for Company's determination. . . . There is no evidence 
that(in disregardoffair and prevailing utility practice or of D.P. U. 
admonitions) Company has adopted an unreasonably low debt 
ratio which may be regarded as a "company luxury" imposing 
an undue burden on consumers.9 
The cost of debt is a matter of record and was correctly calculated as 
6.86 percent. The cost of common equity is far more a question of judg-
ment. The company witness expressed the opinion that potential in-
vestors in the common shares of the company would require a return 
of 12 to 12.5 percent upon equity before they would make an invest- , 
ment. However, the Court stated that in the absence of expert testimony 
to the contrary, it could not say that the D.P.U.'s allowance of only a 
10.75 percent cost of equity capital was below the range of permissible 
judgment and, therefore, confiscatory. 
Rate of return, rate base, and attrition. The D.P.U.'s recent attitude 
toward fair rate of return is evidenced by its action in Boston Gas. Be-
lieving that the return which is guaranteed to a regulated company 
ought to be set at or near the minimum consistent with constitutional 
requirements, the department has said: 
This philosophy is particularly compelling at a time when the re-
sources which the petitioning company can place at the service of 
development and presentation of its case greatly outstrip those 
which the Commonwealth makes available for representation and 
protection of that company's customers. If, after receiving the guar-
antee of a minimal rate of return, the regulated company can then, 
by virtue of expanded revenues, operating economies or skillful fi-
nancing, increase its rate of return, this department would not 
9 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609,616, 269N.E.2d248, 254. 
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under ordinary conditions attempt to take away that reward for 
effective management. We do not believe, however, that the reg-
ulatory agency should properly award this additional margin 
merely by administrative fiat. 10 
7 
Consequently, the department awarded a rate of return which was the 
same as the petitioning company's cost of capital. 
The company suggested the use of a rate base as of the end of the 
1968 test year as a basis for counteracting attrition. The D.P.U., on the 
other hand, felt that the rate base should be predicated upon the aver-
ages of accounts as they existed throughout 1968. On this issue, the 
Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the department that use of a so-
called year-end rate base is an undesirable approach to the attrition 
problem. But the Court also held that the department had failed to 
give adequate consideration to the overall question: 
The D.P.U. also, in effect, has given no weight to whatever ero-
sion in contemplated return to Company was indicated by the evi-
dence of actual and expected results for 1969 and 1970. In part, 
failure to do so may have been based upon the D.P.U.'s distrust of 
the feasibility of predicting (during the 1969 hearings) the results 
for 1969 and 1970. In part, it may have been reluctance to adjust 
the actual and adjusted results of the test year by the imprecise 
remedy (for attrition) of using a year-end rate base instead of an 
average test year rate base. The former difficulty no longer exists. 
The actual results for 1969 and 1970 are now known and . . . pre-
dictions [of the company witness] for these years can now be tested 
accurate I y. 11 
The Court, in this regard, recognized that the department would 
have the significant advantage of hindsight in handling the question 
of attrition upon remand. Unfortunately, this advantage is not present 
in cases pending before the department. A company's attrition analy-
sis is prospective in nature and hence is based upon assumptions which 
are difficult to evaluate. The department possesses no greater clairvoy-
ance upon this issue than upon the issue of capital structure, although 
as to the latter issue the Court used subsequent evidence of actual re-
sults to evaluate the reasonableness of the department's prediction. 
It does not appear that Boston Gas requires the department to adjust 
for attrition at this time. The department is required by the decision 
only to make "suitable adjustment of the rates 0 0 0 to reflect any attri-
tion trend which may be confirmed by the 1969 and 1970 figures." 
(Emphasis supplied.)12 Thus, the analysis is to be a retroactive rather 
than a prospective one, with a consequent gain in reliability. Accord-
ingly, an attrition allowance will not be made at the time of the initial 
hearing but will be dealt with on a more continuing basis. Therefore, 
IO D.P.U. 16515 (June 1971). 
11 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609, 624·625, 269 N.E.2d248, 259. 
12Jd. at625, 269 N.E.2dat259. 
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if a company believes that the rate of return awarded as a result of de-
partmental proceedings is being eroded, it would petition the depart-
ment for relief based upon a period of actual experience with the new 
rates in effect. If a company's position is justified, and nothing else 
has occurred to counteract the effects of such attrition, the department 
would have to be prepared to use abbreviated proceedings to grant 
whatever relief was required. 
Cost of seroice. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that D.P.U. 
adjustments of the test year data had not been adequately explained or 
supported by substantial evidence, and that the test year results as ad-
justed by the D.P.U. may substantially understate the gas company's 
revenue requirements. Therefore, the Court said, these adjustments 
should be reconsidered by the D.P.U. in the light of the company's 
1970 financing and in light of its actual 1969 and 1970 operating re-
sults. 
§1.3. Mystic Valley Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities. 1 
The Mystic Valley decision involved appeals by Mystic Valley Gas 
Company (Mystic), North Shore Gas Company (North Shore), and 
Lynn Gas Company (Lynn) from rate decisions of the department 
dated November 28, 1969 (with supplemental orders being issued on 
January 28 and 29, 1970). There was a basic disagreement between the 
companies-all of the New England Electric System (N.E.E.S.) gas 
subsidiaries except Norwood Gas Company-and the department re-
garding selection of a capital structure appropriate for rate setting 
purposes and the D.P.U.'s failure to adjust test year results to reflect 
known future increases in the costs of service. This dispute has now 
been resolved by the Supreme Judicial Court in favor of the appealing 
compames. 
Cost of capital. The companies' witness on the subject of cost of 
capital testified that the capital structure which should be adopted by 
the department for the purpose of establishing new rates in these pro-
ceedings was the actual capital structure of each company. He ex-
pressed the view that each company should "be evaluated as an inde-
pendent company that would be viable and financially sound even 
without"2 the protection of the parent company, N.E.E.S. 3 The peti-
tioners complained that the D.P. U. erroneously disregarded the actual 
capital structure of the companies and the cost of long term indebted-
ness, substituting instead a hypothetical capital structure. The peti-
tioners also claimed that the D.P. U. had attributed to each company 
the debt and other capital costs of the entire N.E.E.S. system and, as 
a consequence, had given it an inadequate return. 
§1.3. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 761,269 N.E.2d233. 
2 Id. at 765,269 N.E.2dat237. 
3 The actual capital structures of the petitioners then were: 
Mystic 
North Shore 
Lynn 
Debt Common Stock 
61.8 percent 38.2 percent 
60.4 percent 39.6 percent 
49.8 percent 50.2 percent 
6
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As the appropriate capital structure for rate setting purposes for 
each of the companies involved, the department used the actual capital 
structure of theN .E.E.S., consolidated as it existed at the time (60 per-
cent debt, 31 percent common stock, 9 percent preferred stock). Costs 
were calculated upon the basis of this structure. 4 The department con-
cluded: 
... (a) that it was "reasonable to use as a guide the [ s ]ystem capi-
talization which reflects the average situation that the gas com-
panies as a group would enjoy today if they had been financed in 
part by permanent securities over a representative period"; (b) 
"that a common equity ratio of forty percent ... [was] too high 
for" Mystic, and (c) that "a capitalization of sixty percent debt, 
nine percent preferred, and thirty-one percent ... [would] be 
fair. . . . " 5 
In support of its decision to substitute for each company's actual 
capital structure a hypothetical capital structure based on that of 
N.E.E.S. as a system, the D.P.U. relied in part on two earlier decisions. 6 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that the judicial decisions re-
lied on "do not permit the D.P.U. to disregard (in fixing rates) exist-
ing capital structures of regulated companies unless they so unreason-
ably and substantially vary from usual practice as to impose an unfair 
burden on the consumer. "7 Moreover: 
With respect to Mystic, the record shows no departure from what 
is (for Mystic as a separate entity) a reasonable capital structure. We 
perceive no justification for substituting a hypothetical capital 
structure for Mystic's actual capital structure .... Rates are being 
set for Mystic and not for N.E.E.S.8 
The Court also suggested that the forthcoming divestment of these 
companies by N.E.E.S. pursuant to an order of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission9 is a factor which justifies their patterns of fi-
nancmg: 
In view of the divestment uncertainties and other factors already 
mentioned, we think the D.P.U. could not fairly regard as un-
4 The D.P.l!. fixed as the cost of debt a return of 5.2 percent which was the then average 
cost of N.E.E.S. debt. It took as the cost of each company's assumed preferred stock 5.35 
percent, which was the cost of a relatively recent issue of preferred stock of a constituent 
N.E.E.S. company, and adopted a return of 10.75 percent as the proper return upon the 
31 percent common stock equity assumed by the D.P.U. 
5 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 761,767,269 N.E.2d 233,238. 
6 New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Depanment of Pub. Utils., 327 Mass. 81, 87, 91-92, 
97 N.E.2d 509, 512-513, 515 (1951); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. 
Utils., 331 Mass. 604,618, 121 N.E.2d896, 904 (1954). 
7 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 761, 769,269N.E.2d233,239. 
8 Id. at 770, 269 N.E.2d at 239. See also Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 
1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609, 269 N.E.2d 248, discussed in §1.2 supra. 
9 New England Elec. Sys. 41 S.E.C. 888 (1964), rev'd, New England Elec. Sys. v. S.E.C., 
346 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1965) rev'd and remanded, 384 U.S. 176 (1966), remanded for fur-
ther proceedings, 376 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1967), rev'd, 390 U.S. 207 (1968). 
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reasonable Mystic's failure during the last decade to issue long-
term debt, at any particular time or even through the whole peri-
od. The evidence also does not show that Mystic (in view of the 
problems of Mystic and the system) has been engaging in a "com-
pany luxury." 10 
In light of Mystic Valley, the department has no choice but to rule 
that the capital structures of each of the companies, as such capital 
structures have been determined by these companies, are fair and rea-
sonable under the circumstances, and do not constitute unnecessarily 
conservative patterns of financing which would have the effect of un-
duly burdening the rate payers. 
Cost of service. The D.P.U., itl using 1968 as a test year to measure 
the petitioners' respective revenue requirements, declined to adjust 
the test year results to reflect fully those wage increases granted by the 
petitioners in 1968 and 1969. The petitioners contended that the 1968 
and 1969 wage increases were sufficiently unusual to require some 
adjustment of the test year results to recognize higher expenses likely 
to be experienced by the petitioners in the period during which the 
new rates would be in effect. 
With regard to property taxes, the D.P.U. adjusted the "test year" 
figures to reflect established increases as of January 1, 1969, in the 
rates of local property taxes. It made no adjustment of test results to 
reflect the increase in taxes on property assessed to the petitioners for 
the first time as of January l, 1969. In its decision the D.P.U. said, 
"[I]t is inappropriate to recognize taxes imposed on additional plant, 
full effect of the use of which is not felt during the test year." 11 The 
position of the petitioners was that to the extent that the additional 
plant, first assessed as of January 1, 1969, is taxed at a substantially 
higher rate than it would have been taxed in 1968, consideration 
should be given to whether the inevitable 1969 tax rate increase should 
not be applied to some extent to new 1968 plant in computing the 
tax adjustment of test year results. 
With respect to wage and property tax increases, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court has ruled clearly that provision must be made for expenses 
of this nature which are certain to exceed equivalent expenditures dur-
ing the test year. 12 Where the amount of anticipated increases is 
reasonably certain, an adjustment should be made in the test year, 
rather than applying adjustment clauses at a later date to rates already 
established. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
§1.4. Maximum rate order on towing by police.1 On October 28, 
1969, and March 10, 1970, the Department of Public Utilities held 
10 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 761, 771,269N.E.2d233,240. 
11 Id. at 775,269 N.E.2dat 243. 
12 Id. at 773-776, 269 N.E.2d at 241-243. 
§1.4. 1 D.P.U. 15967 (November 1970): Investigation by the department pursuant to 
8
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public hearings pursuant to the provisions of G.L., c. 159B, §6C, 
which directs the department to establish maximum rates for towing, 
other than during snow removal operations, when such towing is or-
dered by the police or other public authorities. As a result a maximum 
charge of $12 was set for towing which results from a traffic violation. 
The D.P.U. expended a substantial amount of time and effort on 
this important subject for two reasons. First, the department felt that 
the people of Massachusetts, particularly in urban areas, have been 
subjected during recent years to a highly erratic and frequently ex-
pensive system of charging by operators engaged in the business of 
towing pursuant to police authority. The second reason for expendi-
ture of time on this subject stems from the fact that the legislature has 
set an extremely difficult task for the department: tow car operations 
include a wide variety of activities and are influenced by many differ-
ent conditions and circumstances, and yet the appropriate legislation 
establishes no standards or guidelines to assist the department in its 
determination of towing rates. This is to be contrasted with legisla-
tion governing certain charter bus rates, which provides that rates are 
to be determined on the basis of miles operated, type of equipment, and 
waiting time.2 In addition, before 1971, towing operators had not 
been required to file annual returns with thedepartment which would 
show investment in towing equipment, and revenues and e:xpenses 
related to their operations. Consequently, the department did not have 
readily available the kind of information which ordinarily is neces-
sary to set meaningful rates. While this problem has now been cor-
rected,3 the first returns under the new statute were not required to be 
filed until March 31, 1971, and thus the information was not available 
for purposes of the public hearings which concluded on March 10, 
.1970. 
In spite of the lack of information, the department formulated a rate 
schedule because of its feeling that the public needed the protection of 
maximum towing rates. The departmental objective was to protect the 
public from being gouged by irresponsible operators, while enabling 
the fair operator to run his business profitably. An attempt was made 
to analyze the random and seemingly conflicting treatment accorded 
towing operators and towing rates by the General Court over the pre-
vious several years. Although the problem of setting maximum rates 
for towing pursuant to police order has been delegated to the depart-
ment, the legislature has also set certain maximum charges which may 
be assessed for both towing and storage.4 Because the legislature 
G.L., c. 159B, §6C, and G.L., c. 30A, §2, as amended. 
2 SeeG.L., c. 159A, §11A. 
3 G.L., c. 159B, §6B, added by Acts of 1970, c. 469, requiring the filing of annual finan· 
cia! returns. 
4 Compare G.L., c. 159B, §6C, authorizing the hearings on towing, and G.L., c. 40, 
§220, as amended by Acts of 1968, c. 369. These provisions appear to be in conflict on 
the question of whether maximum towing rates have been set by the General Court or are 
to be established by the D.P. U. 
9
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apparently believes that $12 is a fair maximum charge for towing which 
results from a traffic violation,5 the department has adopted that 
figure. Similarly, the department noted that the General Court had 
increased the maximum permissible charge during snow removal from 
$12 to $25;6 since a similar increase for towing after traffic violations 
was not adopted, the department assumed that the legislature was satis-
fied with the $12 figure. 
The legislature has not spoken on thf' subject of towing pursuant to 
police order which occurs for reasons other than traffic violations, e. g., 
after an accident. Therefore, the department developed a set of rates 
to cover towing for reasons other than traffic violations, 7 which rates 
would be fair to all concerned but which do not feature a $12 maximum 
charge. In this regard the department determined that a $12 maximum 
rate does not take into consideration the difficulties which may be in-
volved in, and the amount of time which may be expended upon, tow-
ing procedures in situations other than those created by routine traffic 
violations. In order to extend some protection to the public on this 
subject and at the same time avoid driving responsible operators out 
of business, the department issued an Interim Order on November 12, 
1970, and stated its intention of continuing its study of the matter to 
determine whether the rate schedule needs further alteration. 
§1.5. Denial by D.P.U. of increase in minimum rates for the car-
riage of dump truck commodities. 1 During the 1971 SuRVEY year 
there was an investigation by the Department of Public Utilities into 
the adequacy of the minimum hourly, tonnage, and yardage rates and 
charges relating the carriage of dump truck commodities within the 
Commonwealth. This investigation followed a request for an increase 
in the minimum rates and charges by the Construction Truck Owners 
Association, Inc.2 Through the testimony of its witness, Frank J. 
5 See G.L., c. 40, §22D. 
6 Acts of 1970, c. 310, amending G.L., c. 159B, §6B. 
7 The rates are predicted on such considerations as the following: push or tow to start; 
flat tow; towing of motorcycles and motor scooters; front or rear end lift; crane and dolly 
tow; wrecker working while standing; waiting time; extra labor. 
§1.5. 1 D.P.U.I6368(March 1971). 
2 The request was filed in March 1971 pursuant to G.L., c. 159B, §6, which provides 
in part: "The department shall annually establish reasonable maximum and minimum 
rates or charges consistent with industry and economic conditions and consistent with 
the declaration of policy contained in section one." The prior prescription of minimum 
rates by the department appears in D.P.U. 15620, 15672 and 15673, each dated Aug. 14, 
1968, under which the minimum rates and charges contained therein became effective on 
Oct. 15, 1968. 
The department concluded that the fact that it had been assigned by the legislature 
the annual task of setting maximum and minimum rates for the carriage of dump truck 
commodities did not mean that th~ department must itself go forward and produce evi-
dence. Rather, it viewed the statutory language as merely mandating the department to 
consider this subject on an annual basis to determine whether any changes have occurred 
since the most recent rate order and to decide whether such changes were of such a char-
acter that the rate order should be amended. The department felt that the statutory 
language did not remove from the party which seeks a change in existing rates the tradi-
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Weiner, Esq., the association contended that the minimum rates were 
too low. Mr. Weiner cited practices of "destructive competition" in 
the industry, including instances of overloading3 and the practice of 
buying and selling commodities by carriers to evade filed rates.4 Peti-
tioner further claimed that there is a large turnover in the industry 
resulting from the inability of small carriers to make adequate returns 
oq their investments, and the association offered into evidence a tariff 
from the state of Connecticut which contained substantially higher 
minimum rates and charges than does the equivalent Massachusetts 
schedule. 
The D.P.U. felt that the testimony given by Mr. Weiner was con-
siderably undercut on cross-examination, that the testimony was based 
on a limited sampling, and that there was no testimony, other than the 
bald assertion by the witness, that the situation in the dump truck in-
dustry in Connecticut was the same as the situation in Massachusetts. 
Furthermore, the department claimed that the rate schedule in Con-
necticut was not the product of the Connecticut commission's delib-
eration, but was simply a filing which the commission chose not to 
challenge. It was the department's position that it might look as easily 
to states such as Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island, 
each of which has chosen to have no minimum rate regulation at all. 
In emphasizing that minimum dump truck rates are an important 
factor in the economy, the department said: 
Because the cost of so much construction is affected by such rates, 
their alteration can have a significant effect upon a large segment 
of the public. A great deal of dump truck work is done for the 
Commonwealth and for the cities and towns; if the rates for truck-
ing related to the building of roads, public buildings and other 
public works go up, obviously taxes must be affected. Likewise, 
trucking costs are a component of the eventual price of goods in 
the market place.s 
The department felt that it had to be particularly careful during an in-
flationary period not to take unwarranted action in rate proceedings 
which could have the effect of aggravating an already difficult econom-
ic situation. Although aware that dump truck owners are themselves 
affected by inflation, the D.P.U. concluded that the burden was still 
upon the owners to establish that existing minimum rates were not 
adequate. With this burden of persuasion in mind, the D.P.U. found 
tiona! burden of proving that such a change is warranted. See D.P.U. 15620, Petition o£ 
the Dump Truck Owners Association, Inc., dated Aug. 14, 1968. 
3 As where the carrier, hoping to gain a competitive advantage, agrees to carry five 
and one-half tons at the minimum rate set for five tons. 
• As where the carrier purchases sand or gravel from a supplier and sells it to a contrac-
tor, rather than acting as carrier for the sand or gravel. The carrier sells "his" commodity 
at a profit margin which is less than the minimum rate he would have received as a 
carrier. 
sn.P.U.l6368(March 1971). 
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no testimony which would warrant a finding that costs had so in-
creased as to make the present rates confiscatory. The department de-
cided that any change in the minimum hourly, tonnage, or yardage 
rates would, in the light of the record, be wholly arbitrary, and it 
ordered that the existing rates and charges remain in full force and 
effect. 
After acknowledging its responsibility for establishing minimum 
rates, the D.P.U., consistent with its present consumer-oriented philos-
ophy, nevertheless felt constrained to comment that its experience 
indicated such minimum rates are not desirable. 
Minimum rates have two general effects, neither of which is 
helpful to the general public. First, minimum rates protect mar-
ginal carriers who find it difficult to provide adequate service, 
and who-in an unregulated economy-would probably be 
driven out of business. Second, minimum rates discourage effi-
cient carriers from maximizing their efficiency, since-regardless 
of how efficient they become-there is always a rate floor which 
prevents them from passing on potential savings to consumers. 
We recognize that Chapter 159B is based on a desire "to foster 
sound economic conditions in such transportation" (of proper-
ty by motor carriers) (G.L., c. 159B §1). Sound economic condi-
tions are not served by development of rate schedules which pro-
tect carriers which are not equipped to provide adequate service. 
We believe that the Massachusetts public will, in the long run, 
be better served by permitting the rates of this industry to adjust 
themselves on the basis of a free economy. Such a philosophy will 
admittedly result in the failure of some carriers. But it is our view 
that rate regulation ought to have as its primary objective the 
protection of the public, rather than the protection of the regu-
lated industry.s 
§1.6. Regulations on billing and termination procedures for resi-
dential customers of gas and electric companies. 1 On December 16, 
1970, the Department of Public Utilities put into effect a series of regu-
lations designed to protect the residential customers of gas and electric 
companies. Specific procedures were provided for billing, termination 
of service, and appeal by the customer of disputed portions of a bill.2 
6 lbid. 
§1.6. 1 D.P.U.l6696(Dec.l970). 
2 Ibid. Regulation 1-Application. The following regulations "relate solely to bills 
rendered to residential customers by gas and electric utilities." 
Regulation 2-Billing and Payment. This regulation provides in part: "All utility 
bills . . . shall be payable upon receipt, provided that no bill rendered by a company 
which bills on a monthly basis shall be considered 'due' for purposes of General Laws 
Chapter 164, Section 124, [termination of service] ... in less than 45 days from receipt 
or unless time that has elapsed between receipt of such bill and receipt of the most recent 
previous bill for the company services, whichever period is greater." The regulation 
then provides for an extended payment pericxj. when a company bills upon the basis of 
periods longer than one month. This regulation also provides:"No disputed portion 
of a bill shall be considered 'due' for such purposes during the pendency of any com-
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Shortly after the effective date of these regulations, a number of utility 
companies instituted an action against the D.P.U., pursuant to G.L., 
c. 25, §5,3 and applied to the Supreme Judicial Court for a stay of the 
plaint, investigation, hearing or appeal under these regulations." 
Regulation 3-Actual Meter Readings and Estimated Bills. This regulation provides 
in part: "If a company uses an estimated billing procedure, it shall-at least every other 
month-make an actual meter reading and render a bill for the appropriate amount 
determined by such reading." This regulation then makes provisions in cases where the 
company is unable to make an actual reading other than by direct refusal of permission 
by the customer, as well as, when the customer makes meter reading unnecessarily diffi-
cult. 
Regulation 4-Termination of Service. This regulation provides in part: "Service 
can be terminated only if: a bill is not paid within 45 days from receipt . . . and the 
company not earlier than 30 days after receipt of the bill gives the notice required by 
Chapter 164, Section 124 of the General Laws of its intention to terminate on a date not 
earlier than 48 days after receipt of the bill; and the bill remains unpaid on the termina-
tion date indicated on the written notice. . . . [I]n no event shall service be terminated 
for failure to pay the portion of any bill as to which there is a complaint, investigation, 
hearing or appeal pending under these regulations. The company shall, however, be 
entitled to terminate service for failure to pay any portion of a bill which is not the sub-
ject of a complaint, investigation, hearing or appeal pending under these regulations. 
If a customer notes a dispute under Regulation 5, the utility may terminate service only 
as provided in this regulation and only if full payment of any disputed amount has not 
been made: 
(1) within 7 days after the decision of a complaint officer ... which has not been 
appealed, after the company has determined that no appeal has in fact been taken; or 
(2) within 3 days after receipt of a decision by the Department of Public Utilities on 
an appeal which is unfavorable to the complainant; or 
(3) within 21 days of the date the customer appeals to the Department of Public 
Utilities if no final or temporary order by such Department is rendered within such 
time." 
Regulation 5-Investigation and Appeal Prior to Termination. This regulation pro-
vides that a customer notify a representative of the company prior to termination that any 
matter relating to billing is disputed; that the company shall refer the matter to any 
company-designated complaint officer who shall investigate the customer's complaint 
and shall send notice in writing to the customer that the bill was inaccurate or substan-
tiating its accuracy and advising the customer of his right to appeal within 7 days from 
the decision of said complaint officer; and that if within 7 days of the complaint officer's 
decision the customer notifies the D.P.U. that he wishes to appeal said decision, a repre-
sentative of the department shall notify the company of said appeal and thereafter con-
duct an investigation, which investigation shall not be construed to be an adjudicatory 
proceeding as defined by G.L., c. 30A. 
Regulation 6-Final Order. The department shall, after an investigation in accor-
dance with Regulation 5, make a final order with regard to the complaint. 
Regulation 7 -General Right to Investigation and Hearing. This regulation provides 
that any person aggrieved by any action of a utility company allegedly in violation of 
these regulations may require an investigation under the provisions of said regu-
lations. 
Regulation 8-Multiple Meters. This regulation states that it shall be the policy of 
all gas and electric utilities to discontinue the practice of billing each residence unit in 
a multiple residence unit on the basis of an estimated allocation made from readings 
from a single meter, and that said utility shall convert to a system whereby each resi-
dence unit to be billed has a separate meter measuring only the service rendered to that 
unit. This regulation then provides for temporary procedures to be utilized by the utilities 
pending conversion. 
3 G.L., c. 25, §5, provides in part: "An appeal as to matters of law from any final deci-
sion, order or ruling of the commission may be taken to the supreme judicial court by an 
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department's regulations. The stay was granted on February 9, 1971. 
Thereafter, the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute and the Massa-
chusetts Welfare Rights Organization petitioned the Supreme Judicial 
Court for permission to become respondents, and their petition was 
allowed. The following include some of the interesting legal issues 
which may be raised in the pending case: (a) whether there were find-
ings of fact as to the necessity of the regulations prior to their adop-
tion; (b) whether the appellate procedure for customers meets due 
process standards, particularly with regard to the hearing before the 
D.P.U. representative (the proceeding does not require a record, find-
ings of fact, or conclusions of law, and there is no further appeal); (c) 
whether statutory rights to an adjudicatory proceeding can be elimi-
nated by an administrative regulation;4 and (d) whether the utility 
companies have standing under G.L., c. 25, §5 to appeal the adoption 
of these regulations. 
C. LEGISLATION 
§1.7. Acts of 1971, c. 1093.1 Chapter 1093 provides for asses-
sing certain utility corporations for the payment of part of the cost 
of operation of the Department of Public Utilities. This legislation, 
which has received the vigorous support of the D.P.U., is important 
because it provides the department with funds to study rate systems 
and to compensate consultants in hearings on rate petitions for the 
benefit of the consuming public. The philosophy behind this statute 
is particularly compelling at a time when the resources which the 
petitioning company can allocate toward the development and pre-
sentation of its case greatly outstrip those which the Commonwealth 
makes available for representation and protection of the consumer. 
Chapter 1093 authorizes the overseeing commission2 to make an 
assessment against all electric, gas, telephone, and telegraph com-
panies based upon operating revenues derived from sales within the 
Commonwealth. This assessment is to be made at a rate not exceeding 
114 of 1110 of I percent, to be determined and certified annually by the 
commission "as sufficient to produce $250,000.00 in revenue." The 
funds produced by these assessments are to be used by the department 
along with other general funds to assist in defraying the general 
operating expenses of the department and may be used to compensate 
consultants in hearings on rate petitions filed by a company subject 
to the assessment. 
aggrieved party in interest by the filing of a written petition praying that the order of the 
commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part." 
4 See Regulation 5, supra n.2. 
§1.7. 1 House Bill 5336, amending G.L., c. 25, was enacted as Chapter 1093 of the 
Acts of 1971. It was signed into law by Governor Sargent on Nov. 15, 1971, and was to be-
come effective on Feb. 13, 1972. 
2 The D.P.U. is under the supervision and control of a seven-member commission. 
See G. L., c. 25, §2. 
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